Fr an: Er, I think it was different because I was able to visualise more of the things that Tolkien had described, and like the landscapes and things when I first read the book I didn't really know what … Tolkien was getting at but then after watching the movies I thought that … I had a better idea of how Tolkien saw the things he'd written about which made it … more interesting to read. […] I think so, er, because I can recognise parts of the books that were clearly in the film, yeah, it just made it easier to visualise and easier to understand. […] Er, I think the second book, kind of without seeing the film, I felt it took a long time to for something to happen just because it's the middle book, so there's not really a conclusion or a beginning. But then after watching the film because I was able to visualise everything and I was able to follow kind of more what was going on and where the characters were headed to it made it easier to read.
These extracts all come from interviews conducted in the third and final phase of our research project into audience responses to the film adaptation of The Lord of the Rings. This research project, involving research groups in 20 countries around the world, had three phases. In the first, many research groups gathered as wide a range of information on prefigurative materials (publicity and marketing, merchandising, and media coverage) as they were able. The second phase, common to all groups, involved a questionnaire: made available and publicised on the web, it was also in some countries handed out outside selected cinemas. In this way, just under 25,000 completed responses were entered into a searchable database. The third phase, carried out Separately and together, they raise questions concerning the meanings and implications of 'visualisation' as part of the processes whereby films enact stories, and whereby audiences build accounts of, and responses to, those films.
'Visualisation' was an issue which our audiences wanted to talk about. In our questionnaire responses, although no individual question asked specifically about this, more than 300 answers introduced the term 'visualisation'. 1. It is not difficult to identify a number of suggestive moves and premises in these extracts. There is, first, the sense that 'visualisation' helps viewers solve narrative puzzles -Marianne's 'clarified it all for me', and Fran's 'I was able to follow kind of more' attest to this. Second, there is a sense that 'visualisation' contributes to a viewer's motivation for participating and their sense of belonging in the fictional worldStella's 'personalised' vision is a stronger version of Marianne's 'more interesting to read' in this sense. Next, it is not so much detailed components that are 'visualised' as how they assemble into wholes -James' 'complete', Stella's 'scope' and 'whole sense', and Marianne's 'it all fitted together' all point here. And finally, these are valued as achievements, non-automatic outcomes to be aimed for.
2. But what is the force of the term 'visual' in here, when James can gloss this as referring to the 'sound, especially'? The English language, perhaps more than many others, has sedimented within itself a range of expressions which appear to privilege the visual over other senses. 3 'I see what you mean' does not require any reference to the eyes or visual cortex. Nor does the concept of the 'mind's eye'. A number of historians of ideas have suggested that European culture, quite widely, has gone through a period in which the 'visual' has come to be seen as the primary sensory mechanism and route. Empiricism, it is argued, placed particular value on visual evidence as our means of in only a few countries, involved selecting individuals after database searches to locate patterns, for in-depth interview. 2 This was an indicative search only. Using ACCESS's facility to permit searches for partial terms, I gathered all responses, in any language, which included the incomplete word 'visuali'. Luckily, this captures cognate expressions in English, Danish, Dutch, French and Spanish. This excludes, then, nine other languages in which we received responses. 3 The history of the 'visual' within Western culture is complicated, and controversial. See for instance Martin Jay (1993) , but see also his partial self-critique in Brennan & Jay (1996) . 'Envisaging "Visualisation": Some challenges from the international Lords of the Ring project', Film-Philosophy, v. 10, n. 3, pp. 1 -25. <http://www.film-philosophy.com/2006v10n3/barker.pdf>. ISBN: 1466-4615 online 4 access to the world beyond us. Whatever the truth of these claims, we need to beware of treating the 'visual' in 'visualisation' too literally.
3. We cannot pass up the repeated component of pleasure in comparisons. (James: 'It was really good to see someone else's interpretation'; Stella: '… one of the reasons I enjoyed the film so much …') This raises an interesting issue about the senses in which 'visualisation' may importantly be shared and collective, as against personal and private. Yet the predominant traditions for thinking about 'visualisation' have emphasised the personal and private nature of visualising and imagination.
There are many other points it would be possible to make, just from these extracts. But what is not yet clear is the sorts of content that a 'visualisation' has, and how these might relate to the (perhaps different) ways in which books and films offer possibilities to audiences for imaginative engagement. In short, is 'visualisation' an otiose term for understanding film audiences, when film is by nature a visual medium?
'Visualisation' and discou rses around film
The term 'visualisation' has had a variety of meanings in discourses round film. The most common has to do with all the processes involved in moving from script to screenplay to film. Within this, a distinction operates between pre-visualisation (which includes storyboarding and conceptual design), and visualisation (which covers a wide range from film stock, locations, costume, lighting, set design, camerawork and so on). Partly arising from these come a set of uses, often closely associated with film reviewing, which address the overall look and feel of a film, and the distinctive point of view it enunciates. This sense of a film as an 'imaginative realisation' can be seen at work in these internet reviews:
' The emphasis in each of these is on the achievement of a visualisation, something which establishes its value. But there is not a single criterion at work here. And sometimes in reviews there is a play around the possibilities. Here, a review of Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy tries to put its finger on a felt shortfall:
'Film adaptations of books are always a melting pot of opinions and all too often the opinion most resistant to melting is that justice has not been done. So is The Hitch Hikers Guide To The Galaxy another culprit to add to the list? Disappointingly, although not said without some reservation, the answer is yes. here in several distinct strands of this work that have sought to determine the 9 For a book which takes an unusual line here, see Wertsch, 2002. 10 It is of course inevitable that I must at least note the existence of a whole tradition of work in which the 'visual' is associated with speculative accounts of 'the gaze'. This tradition has, in my estimation, been absurdly and perilously over-influential within film studies. Belonging more that it would ever dare admit to some very old-fashioned puritanical fears about the 'dangers of seeing', this tradition is also vehemently anti-empirical. For these and many more reasons, I do not discuss it here.
11
For a wide-ranging and very thoughtful examination of a vast amount of this work, see Nigel Thomas, 'Mental Imagery', available at http://www.imagery-imagination.com/ (accessed 20 July 2006). See also the Journal of Mental Imagery (1977-) , an important source for many of these debates although, curiously, with very few contributions considering the role of the media in relation to mental images. Barker effectiveness of imaging, and thence some of its distinctive characteristics. Each, it seems, has had to struggle against continuing opposition to establish the reality (are there such things at all?), their significance (if they do exist, are they not just empty epiphenomena?), and their functional impact (do they make measurable contributions to human responses and learning?). I have located three main strands of such work: within language-learning; within cognitive psychology (and thence brain science); and within literary response theory.
(1) In the field of language learning research, first, there has been considerable interest in the ways in which people's learning might be facilitated by making use of their ability to visualise, in order to overcome costly 'word-by-word' learning and performance strategies. An essay by Jane Arnold (1999) partly covers the same ground, but introduces one or two further suggestive ideas. She too focuses her argument around the benefits 'visualisation' can bring to language learning. This is, she argues, because internal visual images are affect-laden in that they associate an imagined scene with things or events of importance to us, and thus make the associated words and expressions more meaningful to us. She reminds that while the term 'visualisation' suggests connections with sight, in fact imaging can as well involve sound, touch, smell and so on. Arnold lists a series of factors which can allow the effective use in learning of 'guided imagery' (272). These include relaxation, confidence, and empathy; and the achievement of imagistic learning is said to increase creativity, flexibility, and self-confidence as well as learning itself. In one particular respect, Arnold's review goes beyond Tomlinson and Avila's, in introducing the idea that imaging may work particularly effectively where people are able to images themselves performing a language task (269). The implication that our own involvement might become a self-conscious part of visualisation is, we will see, an intriguing one. Sadly, Arnold also betrays a standard prejudice. Her opening discussion of 'visualisation' includes the following: 'If, after seeing a film, we comment that the book is better, it may in part be due to the greater scope of the written version, but it is also very likely to be because as we read the work, we form mental images that satisfy us more than the images we see on the screen' (260). This intrusive adoption hints at the degree to which this kind of work may actually be modelled on a broader, ontological account of 'visualisation' which I wish to challenge.
(2) In a largely unrelated development, cognitive researchers in the USA have for many years argued over the role of 'mental images' within individuals' learning abilities.
Following the move away from behaviourism, within which mental phenomena, if admitted at all, were mere epiphenomena, internal processes struggled back onto the research agenda. One researcher in particular, Stephen Kosslyn, has spent many years researching and arguing on the topic. Early on, he defended the reality of the phenomenon against critics who persistently reinterpreted phenomena as 'tacit knowledge', for instance, or as misunderstood prepositional knowledge.
12 Then, using careful psychological experimentation, he explored the ways in which individuals' ability to conceive qualities such as distance, shape, dimensions, and speed were related to their capacity to image these. This coupled with a growing interest in the properties of the images themselves -how far they need to resemble that which they depict, how 'complete' they need to be to function effectively, and so on. In later phases of research, Kosslyn and various colleagues have turned to neurological science, to locate those regions of the brain activated as people work with images (see Kosslyn et al, 2006) .
(3) Most obviously relevant to my interests is the work brought together by Ellen Esrock (1994) , who has defended the relevance and value of imaging to our understanding of 12 It is interesting how frequently such work has had to stray into the field of philosophy. Kosslyn et al not only report in detail many experiments identifying the nature and role of mental images -for instance, that reaction times to puzzle-solving are slower where people have been asked to imagine objects further away from themselves, because they have to 'travel' to their images of the object. They also have to discuss at some length such things as the critics' conundrum that for there to be images of the kind they conceive, there will also have to be a 'mind's eye' to view them … and another to view the results of those acts … and so on. Their solution to this, curiously, looks like a retreat into computer-conceived version of faculty psychology: 'We can think of the "mind's eye" as a processor that interprets depictive representations … When these interpretive processes are applied to a remembered perceptual information instead of information that is provided online by the senses, an image rather than a precept will be expressed'. She also evaluates a wide range of empirical research, including that of Kosslyn and Victor Nell, 13 in order to secure the grounds for the importance of visual imaging in the reading process.
Disappointingly to me, at the precise point where she has completed her judicious considerations of a wide range of theory and research on the topic, she turns away from actual reader-responses. Instead, in her final chapter, she provides a rather traditional exegesis of the textual demands of certain proffered literary examples. And the conclusions she offers arise more from these textual considerations than they do from her earlier arguments.
A considerable proportion of all these three kinds of work belongs simply to each distinct domain, and only makes sense there. Even so, we can derive some general principles from all this work:
1. Mental imaging or visualising can be understood as a natural, perhaps even necessary, process associated with many kinds of cognitive learning and skills acquisition. Put simply, we may think better where we are able to visualise.
2. Imaging forms a vital part of 'internal speech', through which we rehearse, and plan our daily lives. Internal speech is by its very nature faster and more fragmentary than external speech (according to Tomlinson and Avila it is 'fundamentally elliptical, vague, implicit, concrete, descriptive and narrative'), and it draws upon established neural pathways in such a way that little detail is required for complex images and ideas to be successfully evoked.
Mental imaging, then, is by its nature partial and incomplete (as compared with externalised acts of communication).
It is in effect 'sufficient unto the day', adequate to the tasks we set ourselves. It is not a thing alone, but is grouped with, and interacts with speaking to ourselves, imperceptibly rehearsing bodily movements, and checking our emotional states.
4. But if partial and incomplete, there is good reason to suppose that those who use images more intensively tend to produce more 'complete' accounts than others. Giesen and Peeck (1984) , for instance, found that visualisers would claim to know 5. In general, in fact, the more people deploy mental imaging, the more concrete and sure is their acquisition of and confidence with cognitive structures.
P rob lematising these research t raditions
It is not hard to see in broad ways how these principles could be relevant to thinking about films and film audiences. However, there are a number of aspects which cannot be addressed from within this essentially skill-acquisition frame. There is an inherent individualism in this sort of work, which sees each person acquiring skills, and using mental imaging for this purpose, on her or his own, and is only interested individual differences.
Kosslyn and Jolicoeur opened their 1980 review by stating their interest in 'the scientific study of individual differences', and this emphasis remains right up to their most recent (2006) work. 14 The same is true in Esrock's account, where the whole point at issue is visualisation's contribution to assisting recall, learning and comprehension; and the question is whether these are differentially distributed, leading even perhaps to different 'cognitive styles ' (1994: 125) .
In a different fashion Tomlinson and Avila, although clearly they are interested in social relations of teaching and learning, in fact still privilege the private and personal aspect of a person's inner voice. For example they say: '… inner speech and outer speech are very different both in their grammar and in their roles. We use our inner voice far more than we do our outer voice, which we use to interact with others. Unlike our outer voice, which has to share many features with other voices in order for it to be understood, our inner voice is private, personal and unique. It is our own voice, which we can use and develop however we wish ' (2007) . It is this putative freedom and individuality which I wish to qualify. I am not dismissing the relevance to some topics of this emphasis, but it is strikingly limiting. It disables understanding the mutual support, sharing and co- There are other problems with Kosslyn's work which I note here, but are not quite so central to where I go in this essay. John Yuille (1985a and 1985b) has criticised a number of weaknesses in Kosslyn's work. Part of his critique turns on specific problems in his experimental practices. Partly, it is a critique of the very idea of dealing with issues of mental imaging experimentally. In his 1985b essay, Yuille mounts a powerful critique of the very notion of laboratory experimentation, using many examples to show how it is the very manipulation of the research context, and thereby of the subjects of the research, which produces what are then claimed to be 'findings'. Barker visualisation for them. This kind of individualistic research orientation will not be able to answer questions about possible conflicts between prompting sources. We've also seen the way in which, for many viewers, the personal aspect of visualisation gains in interest if it can be compared, even tested, against other people's visions. Again, an approach emphasising difference, separation and privileging the personal will not find it easy to address the shared, even collective aspects of visualisations. And because of this, it will not readily address the role of visualisation in people's imaginative lives.
Esrock's work, for all its value, reveals a further problem. It is not accidental that her emphasis is entirely on 'visualisation' for literary audiences, or 'the reader'. There is a powerful cultural preference in play which makes it easier to be interested in, and to argue a significant role for imaging in relation to literature than an already-visual medium such as film. Imaging can claim to be an enrichment of a word-based medium. When, for instance, Esrock notes that individuals who image strongly, tend to read more slowly, she can associate that with greater attention and concentration. But films set their own speed. 'concretise' that which is not explicitly stated ('the old man was largely bald' … so, was the remainder of his hair grey?), it is not hard to see that this cannot readily apply to a film, since almost of necessity such additional visual information will have been supplied. It appears that 'visualisation' is being defined and understood in a way which precludes its relevance to film studies. 15 I will not attempt here to provide a full rationale or defence for their ideas. Rather, I hope to mark out their distinctiveness, and show the clear benefits they bring to our understanding of the phenomenon of 'visualisation', and the concrete materials emerging from our questionnaires and interviews.
Members of this school of thinkers all share a common starting point: that human consciousness is best conceived as a form of 'inner speech'. This is because for all of them the command of semiotic processes is a key mark of human beings. As a child masters language, so it transforms itself into a full social human being. But all of them add a second premise to this account: since all speech is inherently dialogical, so inner speech has to be understood as proto-social. It is a readying to speak, the preparation of orientations to the world, to other people's speech. In our heads, we address ourselves as if we were 1. 'Inner speech' is an achievement. A crucial part of the transition from childhood to adulthood is the emergence of the ability to consider in advance, to rehearse thoughts and responses, to go over things in our heads. This is achieved, first, by the encountering adult human semiotic materials on a regular basis. In the process of learning these, children go through a process of what Vygotsky calls 'genetic development'. By this he means that a new mode of social-mental operating emerges which has its own rules. Wertsch summarises this genetic principle as follows: 'once higher mental formations have emerged on the basis of certain dynamic preconditions, these formations themselves influence the processes that spawned them ' (1985: 190) . The implications of this are well captured in a sentence quoted by Wertsch: 'For the young child, to think means to recall; but for the adolescent, to recall means to think' (191).
2. In being an achievement, or an emergent property, human consciousness overwrites, as it were, the component parts from which it emerges. It transforms them into a new set of directions and capacities. local forms of brain damage can certainly assist in therapies, they cannot reductively explain the nature of the emergent phenomena. In related fashion, the automaticity with which mainstream psychology, for instance, has separated mental processes into cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects is also challenged.
3. It was crucial to Vygotsky's approach that the development of inner speech was inseparable from the development of, outer, social communicative competences. It is part of learning to be a competent participant in our society. This had several parts to it, which need noting and thinking separately. First, inner speech is faster, more condensed and less formally organised than any resultant communicative form. In an elegant phrase, Vygotsky draws attention to its 'unique abbreviated syntax' (cited Wertsch, 1985: 122) . Thus far this conforms with the findings of Kossler and others.
4. But while thus far the fit is reasonable, Vygotsky along with his contemporaries has a quite distinctive answer as to why and how this happens; and a series of distinctive implications flow from this. Vygotsky posits a distinction between the 'sense' and the 'meaning' of words. By 'sense', he refers to 'the aggregate of all the psychological facts emerging in our consciousness because of the word'. It is with these that inner speech works, increasingly confidently as a child masters its language. 'Meaning' relates to how that flux of motivated feelings are held together by the shared repertoire of terms that make up a social vocabulary. Each word, in use, depends upon 'that fixed, unchanging point which remains stable during all the changes of sense in different contexts' (cited, Wertsch, 1985: 122) . 16 'Sense', meanwhile, contextualises meaning, telling us how something matters in a particular context. Further, while it is evident that for Vygotsky inner speech involves words in sequences, there is nothing to say that the way in which associations flow in and around them should not simultaneously draw in all kinds of sensory experiences. This is important inasmuch as it undoes the need, which Kossler in particular has felt, to argue for the separate occurrence of imaging. In fact, it may well be that his experimental routines, which seek to isolate imaging processes, produce a separation that may be very unlikely. In day to day operations, words, images, sounds, memories are thoroughly imbricated.
5. At this point we need to introduce two further features mainly discussed by Bakhtin and Volosinov. Vygotsky does not directly address them, perhaps because they are least important and visible in relation to children's development, which was at the centre of his attention. Both relate to the ways in which inner speech may be understood as historically-situated. Wertsch, in his critical exegesis of Vygotsky's approach, himself imports one such feature from Bakhtin's work. He shows how Bakhtin emphasises the ways in which, within different literary traditions, different 'voices' are mixed, and mutually embroiled, but in varying ways in different literary traditions and different historical periods. These are, he argues, 'forms of dialogicality' -the available conventions and rules for how we speak and relate to each other -and they shift across time and place. They have histories, and we are all born and form ourselves within those histories. How we think to speak, therefore, how we know to rehearse public forms of address, is historically varied. Volosinov, too, argued along these lines -but with a slightly different intent. He argued that speech (spoken, 16 Volosinov developed the same distinction, but using different terms to describe it. He separated, and then related, 'that factor of unity' that is common to a word across the 'as many meanings as there are contexts of its usage ' (p. 90 it as a work of art (see Rieber & Robinson, 2004: 102) . Vygotsky then writes: 'We observe something analogous -in inner speech. In inner speech the word, as it were, absorbs the sense of preceding and subsequent words, thereby extending almost without limit the boundaries of its making' (cited Wertsch, 1985: 127) . Again, in explicating the role of intonation, Vygotsky cites Dostoyevsky's famous short story of the five workmen who conduct an entire conversation using one swear-word to each other. His point is that their belonging to a common community enables them to 'read' each others' motives and intonations -their several specific transformations from inner to outer speech -and thus 'say' far more than they say. But again, it is a literary example.
The possible implications of this are very striking to me. If imaginative artistic expression offers the best model for scholars to conceive how inner speech works, perhaps we might go further and say that it also actually provides much of the models whereby human minds manage the transformation of inner into outer speech. Let me try to explain what I am saying here. In Vygotsky's account, one of the least important factors of 'inner speech' is that it is inner. He strongly rejects and refutes any notion that inner speech is outer speech that has learnt to be silent. On the contrary, he takes from Piaget the notion of This throws light on a puzzle I have with one aspect of Vygotsky's work. Vygotsky insisted that inner speech is always motivated. That is, inner speech is always connected to interests, desires and impulses. As put, this is not, to be honest, a particularly insightful addition. My suspicion is that it was driven by the need to demarcate this whole approach from the emergent behaviourism of psychologists such as Pavlov (in Russia) and Watson (in the USA), who reduced human communicativeness to 'responses' in the stimulus/response model. 17 But a bare insistence on the omnipresence of desire and interest in relation to inner speech has the same force as the more recent insistence that audiences are 'active', in the latter case as a counter to the model of audience 'passivity' embedded in American 17
This 'reading' of Vygotsky is supported by the remarks he makes on the concept of 'consciousness', which he seeks to rescue from 'reductionist psychologies'. He particularly opposed the separation of the intellectual side of consciousness from 'all the fullness of real life, from the living motives, interests, and attractions of the thinking human' (cited Wertsch, 1985: 189) . Barker mass communications research. But in the same way that 'the active audience' turns out to be a rhetorical figure, so does the 'desiring' inner speaker. To become useful, we have to be able to distinguish and grade levels and kinds of desire. And this allows us to consider one expansion of the work of these thinkers, but in accord with their basic premises.
Vygotsky, as we have seen, saw human thought as obeying a 'genetic principle', that is, its achievement constitutes an emergent process whereby the rules of operation change because of the new capacities achieved. Consider the possibility that 'visualisations', with their will to completeness, constitute such an emergent process. The more completed a person's visualisation, with all the attendant sense of wholeness, commitment, and sense of belonging, the more the principles of this visualisation become the basis of a person's engagement with the story-world, the principle of evaluation, and of attached significance. We would think differently towards a film, and make use of it differently, in light of having achieved such a visualisation. Putting it in a more vernacular say, we would have a point of view, a position from which we conduct our encounter with the film.
18 At this point, the self-consciousness of the process would become of critical importance. 18 In the course of directing the Lord of the Rings project, and in particular as I have worked at the analysis and understanding of the materials it generated, I have been led to investigate any fields and traditions of thought rarely visited by film scholars. In the course of trying to make sense of viewers' passionate involvements with Tolkien's work, I was led into exploring a whole tradition of work in consumer research, addressing 'passionate consumption'. The most recent exposition of this has come through the work of Russell Belk and his colleagues. But here, I want to say something about the origins of this work, which are relevant at this point. In the 1960s, just at the same time as public opinion and market researchers were rather desperately trying to understand and deal with 'alienation' among its publics, one key figure introduced a distinction which might help, and explain the circumstances under which consumers would 'drop their guard'. Herbert Krugman, vicepresident of the opinion-polling organisation Marplan, introduced what he called 'involvement theory' in his 1965 Presidential Address to the American Association of Public Opinion Research. Krugman was interested in the fugitive nature of advertising's influence. Just to be memorable they needed both repetition and recency. He proposed that the missing factor was 'involvement', the salience that an advertisement has for its audience. To get this, advertisers will need to 'play along with' an audience (in a disturbing analogy, he cites Hitler's use of anti-semitism as an example of successfully used salience). His argument is that both commercial and academic research on persuasion has become blinded to 'two entirely different ways of experiencing and being influenced by mass media' (355): one characterised by lack of personal involvement, the other by high degrees of involvement. But what does 'involvement' mean here? In a subsequent (1966) essay Krugman sought to operationalise it as 'the number of "connections" that the subject makes between the content of the persuasive stimulus and the content of his own life' (584). This of course makes the relationship still cumulative, rather than seeing involvement as potentially transformative, because of the tendency to an integrated, coherent relationship. From a persuasion perspective, that would be no help. What Krugman wanted, was the dropping of guards. responses, and what further sense can we gain from them, now? I will not claim on this occasion to have used a clearly delineated method for coding and analysis, since this is an exploratory study, not attempting to be definitive. I focus here on seven strands, and illustrate these, for reasons of space, with just a few examples:
1. The term 'visualisation' is used almost entirely by those who are strongly enthusiastic about Tolkien's story-world. In fact, for most, they are also enthusiastic about the film. The film has passed tests of adequacy. That does not stop people occasionally noting slips, gaps or discrepancies. But these are noted as exceptions. The reason for this is that the term 'visualisation' does not refer to an additive achievement -getting a majority of things right, as it were. Rather, it evokes and conveys a sense of an achieved whole. A visualisation is almost automatically a good thing because it is an achievement, a gestalt of meanings and emotions, rather than just a pictorial enactment (although of course pictorial success is logically part of the 'whole'). This is suggested also by the frequent use of organic, totalising terms to fill out 'visualisation': it is 'complete', 'perfect', a 'vision', 'my imagination come to life'. The result, indeed, is an intensified life in the story -a strengthening of both meanings and emotions, a stronger and richer connection with narrative, actions, characters and thematic purposes. (A striking example: 'Breathtaking convincing visualisation of scenes from the book. Grandiose, captures the mythical dimension, human quest versus universal forces'.)
2. People have no difficulty at all thinking of a film contributing to a 'visualisation'. There is, in other words, an ontological distinction between the visual aspect of a film, and a resultant 'visualisation'. The latter will of course have visual image components, but it will also embrace other senses along with understanding of characters and motivations, and a sense of the rules and laws that govern behaviours in this 'world'. There is, in other words, a tendency to transcend medium. People tend to talk of the 'world' of the film, as both object and goal. enables them to imagine things that individuals can't always manage. And with gratitude goes, often, acknowledgement of the risks that they took, and the courage required of them.
4. These lead to the most common response of all, one that embraces so many people (and they know it, which is also important). It is the sheer pleasure of seeing an external embodiment of one's previously private imagining. What people appear to gain from this is a confirmation not only that they were on the right lines, but also that it is thus a shared, public property. ('The visualisation of someone else's vision of MY Middle-earth and the peoples who inhabit it' -note the emphatic claim to possession even as the comparison is made.) One answer, by perversely saying the opposite, reveals this tendency most strongly: 'I feel just a tinge of sadness that millions of people will share a vision of Middle-earth that I had thought was personal to me for so long. It was as if someone had got inside my head and broadcast my dreams and visualisations'. What is important is the intersection of a public with a personal history: 'To see places I had visualised since I was a boy'; 'I've loved the books for ages and ages and wanted to see them visualised'; but also 'I hope the films would visualise the books for me'.)
5. This sense of a shared imagining -that 'someone else' has conceived this whole world in the same way -has itself several versions. In some cases, it is as a comparison -I saw it like this, they did too, that's amazing! ('Seeing how someone else visualises the books has just been a great kick!!'; 'I wanted to know how others had visualised the places from the book and if they were similar to how I had imagined them …'; 'I wanted to see how my interpretation stacked up to someone else's'). It's sometimes a sense of increased value as a result -this confirms what I have always thought and felt! Elsewhere it is a sense of communicated vision. Sometimes specific groups and locations are suggested, in for instance answers that talk about 'fans' and the 'masses'. At other times it is stated more openly as in this answer: 'The strongest point is that it almost perfectly visualised my own fantasies about Middle Earth ever since I read the books for the first time 33 years ago. All characters and sets are just as I imagined, even better. Remarkable is that this is the opinion of many people who read the book all over the world'.
6. A feature of 'visualisations' which could almost pass unnoticed, because it might seem obvious, is their self-consciousness. People who achieve significant degrees of visualisation are very aware of doing it, want to do it, turn them over in their minds, and reflect on the nature of their own achievements. Actually, this to me is an important distinguishing feature in its own right. It indicates that these are higher order mental constructs, and they may only arise when there is exceptional motivation and commitment. And with this goes what I would see as a very particular enactment of Vygotsky's principle of motivation. People are effectively declaring a commitment to this world. In the act of visualising, people attach import and significance to the story-world.
7. Finally, and almost as an outcome of whatever people take from all the above, comes a stronger sense of belonging and ownership. This story is more mine because I now see how it can also belong to others. 'I'm not sure you will understand because I myself don't truly understand it. I am a grandmother of 52 years old and I never reacted to any movie like I have to these films. I think it's because of my love for the books since I was a teenager, but it's also that Mr Jackson's vision is so close to how I visualised the characters, places & story that I feel he saw into my heart and created the movies just In a separate investigation, two of us studied the part played by images of 'New Zealand' in people's imagining of Middle-earth. There were several surprising elements. First, New Zealand became a fantasy geography in that it became large enough in people's imaginations to contain a whole continent and more. However, there were two things it did not contain. First, 'evil' was an importation. Middle-earth functioned as an inherently good place. Third, and most strangely, there was one part of Tolkien's geography which did not appear for many to be in 'New Zealand'. That was the Shire. This part remained 'local' to many viewers -that is, they found geographical analogies close to themselves and their own experience and wider sense of place, yet still somehow 
Wider implications
What follows from all this? I suspect there are more, important implications that I am not yet ready to elaborate, but I would at least point to the following:
(1) As an audience researcher, I am fascinated by the potentialities for penetrating audience understandings which 'visualisation' might offer. 'Visualisations' are not automatic productions, they are more-or-less achievements. But if Vygotsky in particular is right, they have all the look of 'genetic' developments -that is, human mental productions which have a tendency to seek completion. People want their visualisations to be coherent and complete. Thus, they enter self-consciousness. The stronger the motivation, the greater the tendency to completion. Something follows from this: epistemologically, not all members of an audience are of equal value. Putting it crudely, we can learn much more from some than from others. I propose four linked stages. Suppose we could (a) find ways to locate, bring into view and then penetrate the most elaborated visualisations of a film (or any other cultural form, come to that); (b) locate the components which typify it, when present in incomplete, unelaborated forms; (c) thereby identify the kinds of audience who share in this visualisation, in both elaborated and partial forms: then (d) we would surely be able to identify the nature and shape of distinct interpretive communities. We would be able to see its tendencies and trajectory, and what it would be like if 'lived completely'. 20 We might even begin to identify the kinds of community which foster the more complete elaboration of such visualisations. But it would not be the 'average' response that will reveal this. It would be the exceptional, elaborated, complete versions that would tell us most. This has complicated methodological consequences which I have attempted to tackle elsewhere. 21 20 I find myself once again drawn back to the ideas of Lucien Goldmann, who many years ago, in particular in his book The Hidden God (1964) , formulated the idea of studying the potentials of a 'world-vision', and how these are actualised in its adherents. 21 Barker, forthcoming. Currently available from the author in Mss form. (2) Not everyone appears equally to form 'visualisations'. But it is not clear why this is so. Is it because there are just individual differences between people, in this respect -some are strong visualisers, others less so? Can visualisation be taught, encouraged, increased? In the fields of language learning, we have seen it used as a 'local tool' to some effect. But the kinds of spontaneous visualisation associated with attaching importance to story-worlds might be different. Or might it be that particular kinds of discursive community better sustain and encourage visualisations, as part of their interpretive response strategies? We don't know. But it is worthwhile conceiving ways in which we might find out.
(3) What happens when a story-world transcends the medium in which it was first postulated? This is the field of adaptation theory and analysis. There are of course those who will 'read' a story strictly in terms of the rules and conventions of the founding medium. Be it Batman and comic books, Jane Austen and the novel, Star Trek as TV series, or Shakespeare as play-text 22 , it is possible to receive and respond to these only in terms of their place within, and contribution to, that medium. Equally, it is possible to generate a transcending account of a story, lifting its depicted world above its originating medium, and giving it a wider significance. Then, it can gain the capacity to be seen as a contribution to the whole of a human culture. A study of visualisations which began to unpick and separate these aspects could transform how and why we attend to issues of adaptation.
(4) Finally, I am intrigued by the (to me, entirely unexpected) possibilities opened up by thinking directly about the relations between inner speech and artistic form. Art in whatever form or genre involves compression and intensification, a multiplication of sense through form, and a combination of rule-following and novelty. It involves an amplification of motive and affect. In invoking one sense, it activates others. And it achieves a unity whilst holding in train all the multiplicity of meanings. These are exactly the qualities which Vygotsky and others attributed to inner speech -but externalised as formed and communicable unities. Art thus appears to speak with the 'very voice' of inner speechbut publicly, communally. 22 There is an interesting ambiguity in here, of course. The academic study of Shakespeare has long belonged primarily to literature departments, in which the plays are studied as texts off the page, rather than as performances on stage. Similarly, the shuttling of certain books in and out of the 'canon of literature' displays the same status-operation at work. The thinking and writing of this essay was a journey exactly as laid out here. I began with the puzzle of those interview quotations, not knowing how best to think about them. In seeking answers to that puzzle, I visited serially all the places I touch on in the essay, and have ended in an entirely unexpected place.
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